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  Defected and Loyal?  
A Case Study of Counter-Defection Mechanisms Inside Chechen Paramilitaries  
 
Abstract: Can former insurgents in the service of counterinsurgent paramilitaries be considered 
a perfectly loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections of 
individuals who have already “betrayed” once? Drawing on a unique set of primary data, this 
article examines the effective counter-defection practices of Chechnya's pro-Moscow 
paramilitaries toward prospective defectors from among ex-insurgents. It explores three 
interwoven mechanisms employed with various intensity to avert “double defections” at the 
peak of the locally fought counterinsurgency in Chechnya from 2000 to 2005. These 
mechanisms are: (1) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and their relatives, (2) initiatory 
violence targeting insurgents' relatives and (3) disclosure of the identities of defected insurgents 
who were responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain insurgents. 
 
Can former insurgents in the service of counter-insurgency paramilitaries be considered a perfectly 
loyal force? What mechanisms may help to deter subsequent defections1 of individuals who have 
already “betrayed” once? Despite the fact that “double defections”2 are a fairly widespread 
occurrence among paramilitary organizations, few studies have explicitly analysed the phenomenon 
of defection among insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents. We likewise have a poor understanding of 
the particular counter-defection measures aimed against side-switchers,3 i.e. insurgents who switch 
sides to join their former enemies. While some studies have covered counter-defection mechanisms 
employed by insurgent groups,4 no study to date has either empirically or theoretically examined 
the counter-defection measures used by paramilitaries on side-switchers. 
 Drawing on the case study of Chechnya, this empirical article starts to fill the gap in the 
extant scholarship on counter-defection mechanisms aimed at both former defectors and double 
defectors among counter-insurgent paramilitaries. Relying predominantly on previously 
unpublished first-hand evidence from the early years of the Second Chechen War, it identifies three 
unique and interwoven mechanisms employed by pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitary units—known 
as kadyrovtsy—to cement the loyalty of former defectors in order to prevent them from returning to, 
or supporting, insurgency. The first mechanism is extrajudicial executions of “double-defectors” 
and their relatives, which were widely practiced by kadyrovtsy as a form of intimidation for other 
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side-switchers among their ranks. The second mechanism was initiatory violence against insurgents’ 
relatives. Finally, by disclosing the identities of defected insurgents deployed in combat against 
insurgents to the families of fallen insurgents, paramilitaries anticipated that the threat of retaliation 
would cut off all possibilities of return for side-switchers. The focus of this article is on side-
switchers because in the particular context of Chechnya in the early 2000s, this group was the major 
target of couter-defection efforts exerted by pro-Moscow paramilitaries. While examining the 
complex phenomenon of defection, this article challenges the established view of insurgents-turned-
counterinsurgents as a genuinely loyal force. 
 To that end, this study proceeds as follows. The first section seeks to provide a basic 
systematization of what is known about defection and counter-defection in various empirical 
settings. The concept of the (dis)loyalty of side-switchers is then addressed by exploring the context 
of counter-defection mechanisms aimed against prospective “double defectors”. The subsequent 
section offers a robust empirical explanation of the mechanisms on the ground through which the 
Moscow-backed pro-Russian Chechen authorities forged the loyalty of the former members of the 
Chechen insurgency who joined kadyrovtsy local paramilitary units.  
 
The phenomenon of defection 
Defection from armed units, especially those deployed in combat, has been a fairly widespread 
phenomenon. Indeed, as long as there are armies engaged in armed conflicts, a certain number of 
troops will for a variety of reasons, such as wartime hardships, ideological incentives, or survival 
itself, seek to desert or defect, depending on circumstances and/or individual preferences. Together 
with desertion, defection poses an imminent challenge for any military force—a challenge that 
cannot be overestimated due to its potential to undermine the military force both physically and 
psychologically. This holds twice as true for armed units engaged in combat, where defection is an 
even worse transgression. It involves not only leaving the fighting army and breaking the oath of 
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loyalty, but also joining the enemies' forces. As such, defection is a move that not only increases a 
belligerent's numerical capacity; it may also serve as a source of insider intelligence, crucial for the 
successful conduct of warfare. Both conventional and unconventional armed forces have 
historically adopted policies and rules aimed at preventing defection among their fighters. In 
conventional armies, defection—along with collaboration and desertion—has been penalized by 
either long imprisonment sentences or death, the latter being practiced particularly in wartime.  
Apart from formally engrained practices implemented in conventional militaries, a number 
of informal practices have been applied in unconventional armies, such as insurgent groups, to 
prevent defection. A voluminous literature on defections has a heavy bias toward examining 
what induces rebels to defect and join their enemies.5 Kalyvas and Lyall have both explored in 
detail the characteristics of ethnic defections, defined by Kalyvas as “a process whereby 
individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations of the ethnic 
group with which they identify and end up fighting against their coethnics.”6 Less common 
are attempts to examine how insurgent groups prevent their members from defecting to 
their enemies. Summary executions of recaptured defectors or deserters and committing atrocities 
against the local population in order to deter insurgents from returning to their villagers for fear of 
revenge are among the methods employed by insurgent organizations to ensure the loyalty of their 
members. During the period 1975–1992, for example, the rebel Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) forced captured children to kill their relatives in front of their villages to make sure the 
children would have nowhere to return.7 The use of psychological pressure, such as cases when 
insurgents have to witness—or even carry out—executions of recaptured defectors or deserters was 
also employed as one of the measures to avert defections.8 Punishment for defectors is death in the 
PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan—Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a separatist guerrilla group 
operating in southeastern Turkey and adjacent areas that advocates for the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish state.9 As detailed by Kalyvas,10 the PKK murdered thousands of suspected 
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defectors in order to prevent possible defections in future. Similarly, the Islamic State has also 
punished defectors with death.11 Allegations have circulated over the Afghan government either 
sentencing defectors to death or giving them long prison terms accompanied by torture.12 The 
Vietcong is also reported to have relied on capital punishment for defectors.13  
The issue of defection in irregular wars has been an obscure area of study for a number of 
reasons. First of all, in contrast to conventional warfare, incumbent forces engaged in 
counterinsurgency operations are not very likely to switch sides to join insurgents. As observed by 
Kalyvas14 using the example of the decades-long Turkish counterinsurgency against the PKK, while 
hundreds of PKK fighters have switched sides during the conflict, “… it would be hard to find 
ethnic Turks fighting on the side of the PKK.” The example of Cuban soldiers serving General 
Batista switching sides to join Fidel Castro’s rebel during the Cuban Revolution is one of the few 
rare examples of members of a conventional force joining a rebel force.15 Such defections occur 
more often during conflicts that fit the definition of a civil war16 than in more asymmetric 
insurgencies. Cases of defection from government forces to rebel ranks also tend to occur in those 
irregular conflicts where the conventional army is weak or corrupt. Recidivism remains a serious 
issue, for example, in the Afghan army, “especially since fighters who do not secure employment 
frequently return to the insurgency or illicit activity.”17 In fact, there have been cases in Afghanistan 
in which members of the local police and army, with earlier defectors among them, opened fire on 
their fellow or allied troops.18 Additionally, defected members of insurgent groups are rarely 
formally incorporated into the incumbent’s armed forces. Such cases as “pseudogangs”—units 
composed of Mau Mau defectors during the British counterinsurgency in Kenya19—and kadyrovsty 
forces, which this article discuss in greater detail, are among the few examples of insurgent 
defectors being organized into separate units.  
The most advanced study on the phenomenon so far has been put forward by Eli Berman. 
Berman formalized an economic model of the defection process in insurgent groups. His model 
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explains that individual insurgents are rational actors seeking to maximize their well-being (utility) 
in a given context.20 According to Berman, the trade-off which insurgents face as they are defecting 
is based on the concept of defection constraint where the well-being associated with defection 
(payoff) is worth more than remaining loyal to their group. Specifically, Berman's model shows that 
the payoff to remain loyal starts at a higher value as insurgents appraise more loyalty to peers,  
friends, their reputation, and being able to live with their family without hiding from their former 
associates. However, as the payoff for defection increases, it becomes more valuable economically 
to defect rather than to enjoy the benefits of loyalty, friendship, and family. At the same time, the 
defection constraint also depends on the individual's potential outside of the insurgent group, as 
well as on his or her outside options, i.e. education and foreign networks. Insurgents with strong 
outside options are expected to have a lower defection constraint as they can foresee a prospective 
future outside of insurgent groups.  
Although valuable in the study of defections, this formal model has a number of properties 
that render it only partially relevant to our article. Firstly, while Berman’s model focuses on the 
motivations of prospective defectors in order to understand insurgent strategies of controlling 
defection, our article explicitly deals with the incumbent mechanisms to prevent side-switching in 
prospective defectors. Secondly, Berman’s model applies to “standard” defectors, while our article 
engages with prospective double-defectors. The latter, as we argue throughout the article, appear to 
be a specific group of a priori less trusted side-switchers. Although data is scarce on prospective 
double-defectors, in referring to available sources, we assume that more watchful attitudes, 
compounded with harsher counter-defection mechanisms, are likely to be deployed against this 
particular group of side-switchers. These essential distinctions notwithstanding, as the subsequent 
chapters illustrate, we partially build on Berman’s concepts of payoff and defection constraint as 
valuable measures for understanding the general logic of defection and its prevention.  
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Defection among side-switchers: An obscure research area   
Cases of “double defection,” or defection among side-switchers, are not uncommon. For example, 
during the Iraqi offensive in Basra in March 2008, around 1,000 militiamen, among them earlier 
defectors, switched sides to join al-Sadr.21 In southeastern Turkey, members of the PKK (who 
previously side-switched to the Turkish military) are known to have defected to the PKK.22 The 
research on “double defection” is nevertheless scarce. This may be explained by a variety of 
reasons. The first among these that is the phenomenon of “double defection” is highly controversial. 
An act of defection among side-switchers casts negative light on the authorities who previously 
adopted defectors into their force. Unlike defection of demobilized, deserted, and disengaged 
militants, defection of side-switchers may pose a major security challenge, which could be 
interpreted as a grave failure on the part of the authorities. Due to the sensitivity of the subject and 
its serious repercussions, authorities, in an effort to retain credibility and avoid criticism, may be 
more inclined to conceal such information than they would be otherwise. The second reason, as 
previously stated, is that in most militaries, severe penalties have been applied to deserters, 
collaborators, and defectors. More commonly, side-switchers tend to be members of paramilitary 
forces that largely operate outside established legal boundaries. In addition, side-switchers are 
usually treated by their commanders and fellow fighters with a great deal of mistrust and 
scepticism. There is therefore reason to believe that side-switchers—let alone “double defectors”—
are more likely than other groups to be subjected to death either in accordance with the legal code 
or as extrajudicial executions. Finally, determining recidivism is notoriously problematic, 
particularly when recidivism falls short of taking the form of physical defection, but rather consists 
of espionage while in the ranks of COIN force. In such cases, it could go on for years without being 
detected.  
 Consistent with the “once a terrorist, forever a terrorist” logic, authorities and the local 
population doubt the intentions of defectors. For example, rumours have circulated in Colombia that 
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“fake” defectors from guerrilla organizations have infiltrated the national counterinsurgency force.23 
The real motivation of side-switchers is believed by sceptics to be penetration of the COIN force 
under the pretext of defection, with the ultimate aim of undermining it from within.24 Such 
widespread rumors may, of course, be explained by the usual paranoia surrounding defectors’ 
intentions observed among local populations and some authorities. The scarcity of hard data on 
“double defectors” could, however, be attributed not only to lower rates of recidivism observed in 
the former group than among demobilized militants,25 but also to the authorities' efforts not to make 
such knowledge public, while “double defectors” are subjected to extrajudicial executions. 
 The scarcity of data on recidivism among defectors may also be explained by the defectors' 
perceived loyalty.26 Insurgents most often switch sides after losing faith in the cause of their former 
comrades-in-arms or due to a non-ideological attempt to settle scores with them.27 Defectors appear 
to have stronger motivation to refrain from recidivism, which in this article is understood in the 
narrower sense of rejoining or providing support to insurgent groups, than deserters or those 
seeking demobilization. Unlike demobilization or desertion— the essentially “neutral” processes of 
laying down arms and returning to peaceful civilian life without the need to join either side of a 
conflict—the act of defection itself presupposes a higher degree of commitment from former 
insurgents to their newly acquired cause. After all, unlike deserters and demobilized insurgents, 
defectors remain in the armed conflict and risk their lives daily.28 One could therefore conclude that 
there would be no need to question the good intent of the defectors. Simply put, why defect if you 
still consider relapsing?  
 The reality on the ground, however, is far more complex. Many insurgents indeed switch 
sides out of persuasion and free will and often sacrifice their lives in the service of their newly 
adopted causes. There does, however, appear to be a segment of those who defect without much 
enthusiasm, and who rather submit to adverse circumstances for the sake of physical survival, as 
reported in the case of some insurgents who demobilized, deserted, or disengaged rather 
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involuntarily.29 Existing empirical evidence suggests that coercion imposed by an incumbent is a 
strong and common incentive for insurgents to defect to their former enemies.30 Pro-Moscow 
Chechen paramilitaries, for example, threatened to kill relatives of insurgents in order to coerce 
them into either demobilization or, more frequently, into outright defection.31 In Kenya and 
Rhodesia, captured insurgents who refused to cooperate, including by participation in combat, 
“would be turned over to the police, where they faced the possibility of long prison sentences or 
even hanging.”32 Reflecting on the Kenyan practice of converting former insurgents into 
counterinsurgents, Kitson33 observes that, apart from conventional “stick and carrot” approaches, it 
is important that a defector is “… given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to 
his friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonourable about his action.”  
It is hard to overestimate the importance 34of indigenous forces, particularly from among 
former insurgents, for the success of locally fought counterinsurgencies. The deployment of such 
forces by the incumbent has often enabled the latter to stem the tide of local conflict due to the 
acquired access to intelligence, tactical advances, and other advantages of using “former enemy” 
combatants.35 Against this background, the loyalty of the defectors is the key to the success of 
counterinsurgency operations. Given that some defectors are individuals who submitted to coercion 
imposed by authorities at an earlier stage, one is not to exclude the likelihood of them relapsing 
should the circumstances necessitate. 
At this stage, it is important to distinguish between insurgents or conventional COIN forces 
and paramilitary organizations. The analysis thus far has been about insurgents or conventional 
COIN forces. This raises the question of how paramilitary organizations, also known as 
counterinsurgency paramilitaries36 or pro-government militias (PGMs),37 deal with the issue of 
defectors’ loyalty. With regards to insurgent groups, one of the most significant guarantees of 
defectors’ loyalty is that defectors who join their ranks from incumbent forces cannot easily switch 
back for fear of being court-martialled or other legal measures. In reality, however, state laws and 
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legal codes are of little relevance for paramilitary groups, which operate in gray zones. In contrast 
to insurgents, paramilitaries often have weak ideological bases, which prevents them from 
effectively indoctrinating their recruits. They have even less options of ensuring the loyalty of side-
switchers. Bearing in mind that paramilitary organizations might offer defectors even less incentives 
to remain loyal than their previous “employers”—insurgents—“double defections” can easily be a 
true plague for PGMs. Indeed, the existing empirical evidence suggests that defections, including 
“double defections”, are a common occurrence among paramilitaries. Jones38 details numerous 
“double defections,” including high-profile figures among anti-Taliban tribal militias during the 
mid-2000s. “Double defections” are also known to have affected Colombian AUC paramilitaries. 
According to Mazzei,39 there were over 800 defected guerrillas among AUC paramilitaries in 
Colombia. Clayton and Thomson40 note that “double defections” were a common phenomenon 
among Iraq’s anti-Al Qaeda Sunni paramilitary group “Sons of Iraq.” This suggests that, in contrast 
to both conventional COIN forces and insurgent groups, paramilitary organizations are particularly 
ill-designed to counter not only ordinary defections, but also “double defections.” The literature to-
date on paramilitary groups has little reference as to how such organizations ensure the loyalty of 
their new members, particularly from among former insurgents. As of this writing, comprehensive 
empirical accounts on specific mechanisms of preventing side-switchers from defecting among 
paramilitary groups are notably absent from the literature. This study aims to fill that gap by 
presenting a micro-level empirical analysis of how the Chechen paramilitary group kadyrovtsy 
employed various mechanisms of ensuring the loyalty of side-switchers.        
 
Data and methods 
Empirically, despite episodic journalistic accounts and reports by human rights organizations, 
Chechnya's pro-Russian authorities' counter-recidivism strategy with respect to defected insurgents 
remains largely unknown. Absent first-hand data on the subject, we clustered a unique data set of 
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interviews with former insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents. For purposes of this research, we 
carried out interviews with former (three) members of pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries, 
kadyrovsty, and Chechnya-based police force. Access to them was obtained through long-term 
contacts with members of the Chechen insurgency and Chechen diaspora communities scattered 
across Russia, Europe, and the United States. Interviews with 12 members of Chechen émigré 
communities scattered around Europe, most of which are current asylum seekers or permanent 
residents who were selected for interviews on the grounds of their first-hand experience with the 
researched phenomenon (for instance, being relatives of kadyrovtsy or former insurgents) were also 
conducted. In addition, interviews with scholars (three), human-rights workers (two), and 
journalists (three) with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomenon were carried out. 
Remarkably, the interviews revealed considerable concurrence among the testimonies of all groups 
of interviewees.  
 While this sample is not representative, this study still constitutes the only case in the 
existing scholarship in which former kadyrovtsy or members of pro-Moscow Chechen police force 
have been interviewed. As the following sections will illustrate, it is extremely dangerous for 
fighters to abandon the ranks of kadyrovtsy. Although the strict penalization imposed upon 
kadyrovtsy by pro-Moscow Chechen authorities for leaving their paramilitary formations was 
somewhat relaxed in the late 2000s, the decision to leave is still far from risk-free.   
 Due to security concerns, all interviewees consented to be interviewed on the basis of strict 
confidentiality. For the same reason, interviews were conducted outside of Chechnya in Moscow 
and in a number of European and Turkish cities, where current or former kadyrovtsy, members of 
Chechen police force, and civilian eyewitnesses were based permanently or temporarily. The 
interviews spanned the period from 2007 to 2014. To honor interviewees’ requests, their true names 
and identities in this study are concealed, and pseudonyms are used instead. Most interviews took 
place on a repeated basis and nearly all incidents described by the interviewees relate to the period 
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2000–2005.  
 Notes were taken during these semi-structured interviews, as interviewees refused to be 
audio or video taped. Interviews lasted an average of three to four hours. With the exemption of a 
single interviewee—a Chechnya-based political scientist who agreed to talk strictly on the basis of 
confidentiality—the identities of scholars and journalists are disclosed in this study.  
 The empirical study proceeds as follows: we first provide a brief historical introduction to 
the Second Chechen War, the counterinsurgency (COIN), and the process of Chechenization. We 
then identify three unique and interwoven mechanisms employed by kadyrovtsy to cement the 
loyalty of former defectors in order to prevent them from returning to insurgency or providing 
support to it. 
 
A history of armed conflict in Chechnya  
The roots of armed conflict in Chechnya trace back to 1994. At that time, following a three-year 
period of Chechen de facto independence, the Russian Army marched into the breakaway republic 
and started a war that lasted nearly two years and claimed the lives of tens of thousands of 
Chechens, predominantly civilians.41 Despite Russia's vast military and economic superiority, the 
local insurgency managed to inflict sensitive blows to the invaders. Consequently, incapable of 
breaking the backbone of Chechnya's increasingly popular insurgency, Russian troops pulled out of 
the republic in 1996 in a move that was widely interpreted as Moscow's defeat.42   
 Post-war Chechnya was a country in ashes, with absolute unemployment and lacking 
healthcare, education, and social services. Against this background, a three year intermezzo of 
independence recurred, with Chechens proving incapable of establishing a functioning state. Some 
influential warlords—heroes of the previous war—refused to acknowledge the authority of 
Chechnya's secular government in Grozny, led by President Aslan Maskhadov. On some occasions, 
frictions between various camps of veterans escalated into violent clashes. The clashes peaked 
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during 1998–1999, when the republic's minority, yet increasingly vocal and determined, Salafi-
jihadist community led by the infamous Shamil Basayev, sought to undermine Maskhadov's 
authority on the grounds of its “godless” nature.43 In order to overthrow Maskhadov's rule and 
establish an Islamic theocracy across the North Caucasus by means of sparking popular anti-
Russian rebellion, Basayev-led Chechen-Dagestani jihadist forces invaded neighbouring Dagestan 
in August 1999. Instead of instigating a pan-Islamic revolt, the jihadist invasion ran aground a 
unified Russo-Dagestani resistance, and the jihadists were expelled from Dagestan in less than a 
month.44  
 In September 1999, apartment bombings in Russian cities, widely interpreted as Chechen 
jihadists' vengeance for their failed incursion, shook Russian society as they left 300 civilians dead. 
Coupled with the Dagestan invasion, these terrorist attacks were used by Russian authorities as a 
pretext to launch a renewed war on Chechnya in September 1999, taking hold of Grozny in early 
2000 and of the rest of the republic later in the year. The armed conflict did not end, however, and 
Chechen insurgents—aided by some of the local population—moved to the country's heavily 
accessible mountainous areas in the south and switched to guerrilla tactics. In the years to come, 
Chechen insurgents continued to put up a fierce resistance to Russian troops, with the prospect of 
pacified Chechnya still beyond sight. As the Russian military failed to create its power base within 
the Chechen population, it lacked necessary intelligence on the identities of insurgents and their 
local supporters, which made selective targeting difficult. Instead, as in the First Chechen War, the 
Russian military largely relied on large-scale mop-up operations, known as zachistkas, and random 
shelling of villages allegedly collaborating with the insurgents. As a result, dozens of mass graves 
containing bodies of hundreds of missing Chechen males, often with signs of sever torture and 
mutilation, can be found across the republic. Human rights organizations have as a result decried 
the widespread use of indiscriminate violence by Russian military authorities.45 The effect of 
indiscriminate violence was, however, rather counterproductive. As zachistkas turned almost every 
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Chechen male between the ages of 16 and 60 into suspects, thousands of Chechens, driven by the 
honour-centred exigency to retaliate, mobilized into insurgency units, while thousands of others 
sought to aid them.46 As a result, and as observed by a Russian combat general who served in 
Chechnya in 2004, the Russian troops were “so busy just trying to ensure their own security” that 
they “almost never encounter[ed] the guerrillas.”47 
 In an effort to stem the tide of the local conflict, Moscow delegated increasingly 
considerable military and political powers to the local pro-Russian authorities established at the turn 
of the century. Headed by Akhmat Kadyrov, a reputed Sufi cleric and a former high-ranking 
separatist, a special paramilitary force—kadyrovtsy—was established in the early 2000s, with the 
major task of fighting the local insurgents.48 Membership in kadyrovtsy units provided many young 
Chechen males and their families with the guarantee of physical survival against the background of 
incessant zachistkas and other indiscriminate violence deployed by the Russian military. Some 
kadyrovtsy who are former insurgents joined the COIN force out of free will due to ideologically or 
personally motivated grievances against the insurgents. For others, financial considerations also 
played a role in a war-torn country where unemployment and poverty were appalling.49 Regardless 
of their motivation, most kadyrovsty were former insurgents.50  
 Importantly, at Moscow’s behest, Kadyrov concentrated on former insurgent leaders as his 
former comrades-in-arms, who he prompted—through both persuasion and coercion—into 
demobilization. In fact, Vladimir Putin's choice of Kadyrov seems to be aimed primarily at utilizing 
the cleric's long-standing contacts with insurgent leaders because, as the Russian president admitted 
at the time, “his [Kadyrov's] contacts with the people who were still putting up resistance against us 
in Chechnya […] will be positive.”51 To facilitate this process, amnesties were declared by Russian 
authorities, which then paved—at least on paper—the legal groundwork for the demobilization of 
former insurgents. These amnesties, and particularly forced demobilizations of insurgent leaders 
detailed below, proved largely effective in that thousands of insurgents disengaged.52  
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 Upon defection, insurgents often faced the threat of imprisonment and interrogations at the 
hands of federal authorities. In fact, due to the perplexity of local and federal agencies in early post-
war Chechnya,53 the security of individual ex-combatants was difficult to ascertain. Russian army 
generals were determined to “screen” ex-combatants on the basis of their presumed participation in 
hostilities or terrorist attacks—activities formally exempt from the amnesties—that caused most 
concern amongst demobilized or demobilization-seeking Chechens.  
 Russian military officers were particularly concerned over the high percentage of 
demobilized insurgents in the newly formed kadyrovtsy units and the prospect of continued support 
that the ex-combatants and particularly kadyrovtsy recruits from among former insurgents might 
have provided to their former comrades-in-arms. In an interview with a Russian daily newspaper in 
2001, the country’s deputy prosecutor, General Vladimir Kolesnikov, infamously declared that “the 
district divisions of the Interior Ministry are often assembled on the basis of teips, i.e. on the 
principle of family relationships, without doing adequate checks of their membership in illegal 
armed formations.”54 Referring to internal sources, Kolesnikov estimated the percentage of former 
insurgents in the ranks of the republic’s Interior Ministry in Grozny at 60 per cent. In some districts, 
that figure was believed to be as high as 80 per cent.55 As a rule, the top-down approach prevailed 
during demobilizations and subsequent recruitments into kadyrovtsy units. Insurgent warlords 
brought with them their foot soldiers, usually members of their clans, which provides context for 
much of Kolesnikov's quoted statement. The notorious statement in 2000 by the Russian Minister of 
Interior, Vladimir Rushaylo, upon his inspection of the kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in Grozny that 
"[e]verybody is present here except for Basayev and Khattab,” is also symptomatic.56 Skeptical of 
the ex-insurgents’ true motives, federal authorities disregarded amnesties, sweeping dozens of 
individual ex-insurgents every month.57 
 Notably, Moscow's deployment of kadyrovtsy paramilitaries in the locally conducted COIN 
operations since the early 2000s helped the incumbent to create its power base in Chechen society.  
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Following the killings of insurgents, their relatives, and supporters, kadyrovtsy and their relatives 
found themselves in the midst of blood feuds. According to the prevailing custom of blood revenge, 
insurgents and their families were in a position to retaliate against the relatives of kadyrovtsy, which 
smashed Chechen society into two feuding camps. Indeed, kadyrovsty engaged in grim human 
rights violations primarily targeting the relatives of insurgents and their supporters, which has been 
a highly controversial practice.58 Against the backdrop of inter-clan infighting or the threat thereof, 
political issues – support for the idea of Chechen independence or for rejoining Russia – became 
tangential, if not irrelevant to many.  
 As of 2002, according to a local observer, “both local and Russian police forces had to be 
included in carrying out mop-up operations [in Chechnya]. Recently, however, only Chechens tend 
to be on incursions with divisions of the district military command.”59 Around 2005, kadyrovtsy, 
together with other pro-Moscow Chechen units ultimately replaced Russian troops as the main 
COIN force in the republic.60 Pro-Moscow Chechens’ knowledge of the local social terrain and—in 
the case of recruits who are former insurgents—their knowledge of the identities of current 
insurgents, their hideouts and modus operandi, as well as intelligence stemming from kadyrovtsy's 
relatives, helped the incumbent to increasingly deploy selective violence. Over time, this raised the 
cost of pro-insurgent support among the local population, while simultaneously reducing the 
likelihood of indiscriminate targeting, which helped to isolate Chechen insurgents from their once-
strong social base. Faced with severe reprisals, many Chechen civilians eventually turned their back 
to insurgents in order to save their lives. Besides, around 80,000 Russian troops were stationed in 
Chechnya. They provided backup to the well-tailored COIN operations conducted by pro-Moscow 
Chechens, ensuring the incumbent’s enormous superiority over the insurgents. Consequently, in the 
late 2000s, Chechnya had become one of the North Caucasian republics with the lowest rate of 
insurgency-related violence, lagging behind Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.61  
 In order to explain the causes of what many have considered a fairly successful COIN, the 
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literature has focused on the processes of Chechenization, that is, the deployment by the Russian 
counterinsurgents of indigenous Chechen forces against the Chechen insurgents and the societal 
implications thereof. Specifically, the literature has focused on the strategies and tactics of the local 
COIN,62 the role of co-ethnic militias or paramilitary forces in relationship to intelligence 
gathering,63 the “hearts and minds” approach of the incumbent and the cooptation of the Kadyrov 
clan,64 as well as on the long-term effect of the Chechenization policy on Chechen society.65 
Emphasis has been put on the mechanisms of collective responsibility and civilian victimization 
deployed by Chechnya’s pro-Moscow authorities, and the efficacy of deploying the kadyrovtsy 
paramilitaries as a committed and experienced force with access to intelligence on the ground and 
partial local support.66  
 At the same time, the themes of defection and counter-defection in Chechnya and the loyalty 
of the pro-Moscow paramilitary forces in the ranks of former insurgents have been neglected in the 
scholarship. The literature has mostly produced descriptive accounts on the establishment of the 
kadyrovtsy units without addressing the puzzling question of their loyalties.67 It has been taken for 
granted that the ever-lasting loyalty of the kadyrovtsy units has been based on kinship, greed, or the 
antagonism of defected ex-insurgents toward their former comrades-in-arms in the ranks of 
insurgent groups.68 Yet while the coercive nature of defections in Chechnya has been a widely 
known phenomenon, it is surprising that no study as of yet has sought to explore the reasons behind 
Grozny’s and Moscow’s reliance on these ex-insurgents, and the mechanisms deployed by the 
incumbent to prevent ex-insurgent defectors from side-switching again. As demonstrated by this 
brief historical introduction, the ability to deter former insurgents from subsequent defections has 
greatly contributed to the military successes associated with the process of Chechenization and the 
COIN in Chechnya.  
 Our article builds on Berman’s concepts of defection constraint and payoff in that it explores 
the impact of the three counter-defection mechanisms on the defected ex-insurgents’ willingness to 
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avoid side-switching. We argue that the deployment by the incumbent of the three intertwined 
counter-defection mechanisms enormously increased the defection constraint for prospective 
double-defectors, while reducing the payoff of their prospective side-switching. The extremely rare 
incidence of side-switching in the ranks of ex-insurgent kadyrovtsy, according to our interviewees, 
implies that these mechanisms have proved effective in deterring side-switching as ex-insurgent 
kadyrovtsy sought to ensure survival for themselves and their families. To do so, the next section 
examines three main co-constitutive mechanisms put forward by the Kadyrov administration to 
prevent defection inside its new paramilitary groups: (1) extrajudicial executions of recidivists and 
their relatives, (2) initiatory violence targeting insurgents' relatives, and (3) disclosing the identities 
of defected insurgents who are responsible for killing insurgents in combat to the families of slain 
insurgents. 
 
Mechanism 1: Collective responsibility: Punishing recidivists and their relatives 
Inspired by theoretical debates on collective action dilemma and designed around the concept of 
collective responsibility, the first mechanism imposed by the Kadyrov administration sought to 
increase the level of defections among insurgents while simultaneously ensuring their loyalty. In 
order to increase the cost associated with supporting or defecting to join the insurgency, the new 
pro-Russian forces took advantage of the Chechen clan-based social organization in order to extend 
defectors' individual responsibility to their relatives69. By threatening insurgents' relatives with 
murder, rape, and torture, the Kadyrov administration sought to instil fear among defectors and also 
create intra-clan social pressure against recidivism.  
 Defectors were to guarantee their loyalty by putting not only their own heads on the 
chopping block, but also those of their relatives. Numerous interviews give evidence to the fact that 
kadyrovtsy retained the right to murder the relatives of defected insurgents, either for rejoining 
insurgent units or for providing them with any kind of material support such as clothing, shelter, 
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medicine, food, or even intelligence.70 Unlike the Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces could 
easily identify defectors’ relatives and punish recidivism on the basis of collective responsibility. In 
order to ensure their safety and avoid persecution, former insurgents and warlords rapidly 
developed self-imposed control as a way of deterring recidivism among demobilized insurgents and 
precluding acts of recidivism among the members of their clans.71 The mechanism of recruitment 
into kadyrovtsy units appears to operate on a similar principle, in that: 
 
somebody comes to Ramzan72 claiming that he is being hunted by blood enemies and 
„Wahabbis“, that he doesn’t have anywhere to turn and wants to be taken in. Ramzan’s 
people check whether he is lying. If everything checks out and the recruit really is under 
threat of death, they offer for him to bring along three more people, usually relatives. 
They give him an ID card, weapon, and often even a car, and tell him: „Nobody will 
touch you now, but you must obey all of our commands.“ If something doesn’t check 
out, they kill not only the recruit, but also his three relatives.73 
 
 Collective responsibility was also used extensively by kadyrovtsy to exert pressure on 
hundreds of insurgents with the aim of forcing them to defect. Insurgent leaders were in charge of 
groups of dozens or even hundreds of fighters, usually members of their own clans. The Kadyrov 
clan74 therefore focused on coercing insurgent leaders into defection in order to bring about their 
own foot soldiers’ defection as well. Enormous pressure was thus exerted on the relatives of 
prominent insurgents. Their capitulation would help Grozny to undermine the insurgency 
psychologically. A typical scenario would involve the capture by kadyrovtsy of around 40 relatives 
of a key separatist leader, General Magomed Khambiyev, who served as Defense minister in 
Maskhadov's government and was his closest associate. Khambiyev's relatives were then threatened 
with murder unless the general capitulated. After a period of negotiations with his clan elders and 
government authorities, Khambiyev eventually surrendered in March 2004.75 Another significant 
case was the capture by kadyrovtsy of the relatives of the separatist president Maskhadov himself, 
including his sisters in their late 70s.76 Depending on the individual case, each week or month that 
passed without capitulating would result in the murder of one relative. While Maskhadov eventually 
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managed to withstand this pressure, it proved unbearable for many insurgent leaders, who 
demobilized. Commenting on Khambiyev's capitulation, Memorial—a prominent Russian human 
rights organization monitoring the violence in the North Caucasus—wrote:  
Given the situation that had developed around him, his family, and the dozens or even 
hundreds of both close and distant relatives, Khambiyev had no other choice [...] a 
different choice on his part would have been incomprehensible or unacceptable to the 
Chechen public—buying his own freedom with the freedom and lives of relatives would 
mean violating unwritten laws and codes of conduct.77  
 
Ordinary insurgents were targeted in addition to prominent insurgent leaders in that their relatives 
were threatened with murder unless their relatives defected. As in the case of prominent insurgents, 
when kadyrovtsy blackmail failed to bear fruit, this eventually led to murders or "forced 
disappearances” of the defiant insurgents' relatives.78 
 By building on archaic social traditions such as the notion of collective responsibility, the 
Kadyrov administration was able to create social and individual incentives to deter recidivism 
among defectors. Consistent with that logic, the second and the third mechanisms could be seen as 
interwoven into the complex maze of Chechen traditions in that they sought to reinforce the cost of 
defection as defectors' participation in military activities increased over time. Against this 
background, absolute loyalty to kadyrovtsy and the Kadyrov clan became the only way to survive 
when facing the threat of retaliation from insurgents and their relatives. 
 According to our interviewees, the first mechanism was used most out of the three discussed 
mechanisms deployed by Chechnya's pro-Moscow authorities to deter defection.  
 
Mechanism 2: Initiation killings: "taking blood upon oneself" 
Fresh defectors departing kadyrovtsy paramilitaries were routinely deployed in retributive assaults 
against insurgents' supporters and relatives. Mairbek Vatchagayev details the mechanism of 
recruitment into kadyrovtsy units in that “[i]n exchange for your life, you went to the police and had 
to prove that you parted your ways from the insurgents, you had to take blood on yourself.”79 The 
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term taking blood upon oneself implied that a new recruit was tasked by authorities to carry out an 
initiation killing of an (alleged) insurgent or an (alleged) insurgent's family member or supporter. 
According to interviewees, this practice was particularly commonplace during the early 2000s, 
when hundreds of defectors were distrusted by federal and local authorities and thus had to 
demonstrate the authenticity of their intention to switch sides.80 Such killings usually took place 
during mop-up raids or in the detention camps scattered across the republic, where hundreds of 
Chechen males of conscription age suspected of aiding and abetting insurgent groups were held. 
Such initiation killings might even happen in a recruit’s native village in order to further involve the 
defector and his relatives, thereby linking the first and the second mechanism. 
 The persistence of the custom of blood feud in Chechen society catapulted the kadyrovtsy 
into the status of blood enemies of the insurgents and their clans, thereby inevitably burning bridges 
back to normal life. Faced with such circumstances and in order to survive, paramilitaries and their 
relatives had to bind their fates even more tightly to Grozny and Moscow. This soon turned them 
into both the strong advocates of Russia's presence in the troublesome republic and the fiercest 
opponents of the local insurgency. In addition, scores of new recruits boosted the Kadyrov clan’s 
standing against its rivals in blood feud with insurgents and their clans. The deployment of 
kadyrovtsy—men with various clan backgrounds—in operations leading to extrajudicial killings 
meant that the recruits became, as Chechens say, “bound by blood” to the Kadyrov clan.81 This, too, 
served to minimize the extent of recidivism among defectors.   
 Interviewees point to initiation killings as an important milestone, as many fresh defectors 
who switched sides and joined the ranks of pro-Moscow Chechen authorities rather involuntarily 
initially sought to avoid bloodshed. Among them were those who were still sympathetic to the 
insurgents and their cause. Others ultimately defected for the sake of securing their relatives' 
survival and therefore tried not to become entangled in another risky affair that would ultimately 
endanger their, or their relatives’, lives. In this regard, an act of initiation killing was the point of no 
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return because it inevitably led to blood feud between the culprit’ and the offended's relatives.82 
Over time, this transformed hundreds and perhaps even thousands of Chechen youth into a “class of 
murders, who have no way back would fight for their rights [and survival] until the very end.”83 
Indeed, fresh recruits were routinely deployed in assaults against insurgents' relatives to cement 
their loyalty to the Kadyrov clan and, indirectly, to Moscow. Following initiatory killings, the 
kadyrovtsy perpetrators found it impossible and, most importantly, needless to return to or support 
the insurgency. From then on, the individuals themselves and their relatives could be targeted at 
virtually any time by insurgents, their relatives, or anyone whose relative was offended in a 
previous act of initiation killing. 
 More importantly, the pro-Moscow Chechen authorities specifically sought to deprive the 
fresh defectors of anonymity during initiation killings. As a rule, fresh defectors were compelled not 
to wear face masks in order not to conceal their identities during mop-ups or while working in 
detention camps.84 As a result, the perpetrators' identities soon became known to the local 
communities, and thus the relatives of murdered, injured, or otherwise humiliated individuals. 
According to a former kadyrovets,  “everyone knows everyone in tiny Chechnya, where people are 
either relatives or neighbours […] and it's difficult to conceal something from others, particularly 
when your son was killed.”85 Moreover, the identities of fresh defectors who were forced to kill an 
(alleged) insurgent in a detention camp were then intentionally leaked to the communities of the 
murdered through the kadyrovtsys' networks.86  
 Such tactics were also used in counter-insurgent activities in order to finalize the process of 
building loyalty to Grozny and the kadyrovtsty. The fate of all defectors would therefore become 
inextricably linked to the stability and survival of the pro-Russian administration.  
 
Mechanism 3: Whispering campaigns: Implicating defectors in counter-insurgency killings  
After successfully ensuring defectors' loyalty in pre-combat operations, the pro-Russian 
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administration also developed an in-combat loyalty-building mechanism linking survival to 
loyalty.87 As doubts remain on defectors' loyalty even after "taking blood upon themselves", a third 
mechanism was introduced in order to reinforce defectors' loyalty as they became increasingly 
involved in fighting against the insurgents. Out of fear of potential combat defections, Grozny 
deliberately disclosed the identities of defectors who were responsible for the deaths of insurgents 
in combat to the families of the slain insurgents. In so doing, the Kadyrov administration effectively 
sealed the fate of former defectors and insured that their only chance of survival would be through 
cooperation and dedication to the regime. Interviewees imply that the identities of kadyrovsty who 
brought about the deaths (or fatal injury) of insurgents were often leaked by pro-Moscow Chechens 
to the murdered individuals' local communities. According to a former kadyrovets (Singular for 
kadyrovtsy): 
 
"they certainly did this intentionally […] On the one hand, Chechnya is a very small 
country where information rarely gets lost, so if something happens, you'll sooner or 
later find out what happened […] Yet [on the other hand], when an insurgent was killed 
in combat, Kadyrov's people [lyudi Kadyrova] were quick to bring the information to 
the people about the [identity of] the perpetrator.“88  
 
 
 This often took on the form of hearsay, common in Chechen society, when fellow villagers 
disseminated information about a particular significant event in which some member of the local 
community or clan was involved.89 Given the discrete nature of the COIN raids increasingly carried 
out in the isolated and heavily wooded mountainous areas, such information could only have been 
leaked deliberately. Although there is a lack of hard data on this controversial subject, eyewitnesses 
speculate that rumors were instigated and circulated by the local administration and possibly also by 
locally stationed police garrisons. Given the social climate of post-war Chechnya, where fellow 
villagers' very survival was often contingent on their timely sharing of information (for instance, 
regarding mop-ups, shellings, insurgent raids, and so on), information on the identities of 
kadyrovtsy paramilitaries responsible for the murder of their fellow villagers or relatives in the 
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ranks of insurgents was quick to be passed on.  
 It was also not uncommon for authorities to publicize this information openly, for instance 
by giving public credit to the particular kadyrovtsy fighters for the liquidation of "important 
bandits". This praise usually took on the form of distinctions, monetary rewards, allocation of an 
apartment, and so on. While interviewees are in agreement over this information being related to the 
liquidation of particularly highly positioned insurgents, many have referred to this as ‘the kiss of 
death’, pointing to the high likelihood of such kadyrovtsy being assaulted retributively. In contrast 
to the majority of COIN environments, including the First Chechen War, such instances are not 
publicized in order to ensure the security of counterinsurgents and their families. In an archaic and 
traditional society like Chechnya, such leakages could be seen as accidental, but in fact rather 
represent an intentional and strategic approach to limiting relapse among defectors.  
 
Conclusion 
This article set out to explore the counter-recidivism strategy applied by Chechnya's pro-Moscow 
authorities to counter defectors. Drawing on interviews with former kadyrovtsy, former members of 
Chechen police, eyewitnesses of the Second Chechen War, local journalists, human-rights workers, 
and scholars in Russia and Chechnya, it identified three main mechanisms employed by Grozny to 
ensure the loyalty of defectors, i.e. former insurgents, and prevent them from relapsing. A 
significant number of Chechen fighters who came to form the backbone of the local paramilitary 
force, kadyrovtsy, defected rather involuntarily, having submitted to immense pressures imposed 
predominantly on their relatives. The task of preventing them from rejoining the insurgency was of 
particular importance to the Moscow-backed local authorities.  
 To this end, three interconnected mechanisms were put in place in the early 2000s. First, 
defectors and their relatives were subjected to extrajudicial executions, which proved effective in 
deterring recidivism. Defectors in the ranks of kadyrovtsy paramilitaries could switch sides and 
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relocate to the country's mountainous areas—where insurgent groups had been based since the early 
2000s—join an insurgent group, and survive for years. The certainty of their relatives being 
subjected to "forced disappearances", however, compelled defectors to remain loyal to their new 
cause. Second, fresh defectors were given the task of carrying out initiation violence (killings) 
against (alleged) insurgents, their supporters, or relatives. Such violence, which the authorities 
broadcast to the local communities and relatives of the murdered or seriously injured, paved the 
way for blood feuds in that the "offended" clans were obligated to retaliate. This in turn cemented 
the defectors’ loyalty to the kadyrovtsy paramilitaries and, as a result, the incumbent. To ensure 
survival for themselves and their relatives alike, defectors had to rely on the counterinsurgents—a 
situation from which there was no escape. As long as defectors were part of the incumbent force, 
they were unlikely to be targeted by enemies in blood feud. In fact, the "offended", overwhelmed by 
the Russian-backed kadyrovtsy's military superiority, usually refrained from retaliation in an effort 
to protect their relatives from retributive violence at the hands of kadyrovtsy. Authorities were 
aware of the importance of initiation violence because it was precisely for this purpose that 
defectors were given firearms and first deployed in combat. Third and relatedly, authorities 
deliberately disclosed the identities of defectors responsible for the deaths of insurgents in combat 
to the families of slain insurgents. This, too, initiated the cycle of blood revenge among the 
insurgents and their relatives on the one hand and defectors on the other hand, which effectively 
impeded defectors' possible return to insurgent groups. Taken together, these three mechanisms 
deployed by Chechnya's pro-Moscow authorities enormously increased the defection constraint, to 
use Berman’s terminology, while reducing the payoff of prospective double-defection. As a result, 
the researched period was marked by an extremely rare incidence of recidivism in former-
insurgents-turned-counterinsurgents, as testified by our interviewees. Consequently, the ability to 
prevent former insurgents from switching sides greatly contributed to the counterinsurgent's success 
during the Second Chechen War.  
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 For a variety of reasons, including the intentional concealing of information by authorities, 
we lack solid evidence as to the incidence of recidivism in defectors and counter-recidivism 
approaches applied elsewhere. What we do know is that defectors, be they former insurgents or not, 
are subjected to long prison sentences or executions. The Chechen case is unique in two 
fundamental respects. The first of which is that, the permeation of defectors' kinship networks was 
active rather than reactive as it imposed severe penalization not only on the defectors themselves, 
but also—and more importantly—on their relatives. The second of which is that would-be "double 
defectors", and especially their relatives, would be exposed to retributive violence at the hands of 
the other side. In fact, with defectors' kin engaged in the retaliation scheme through the mechanism 
of blood feud, its ability to prevent recidivism was explicit. While defectors could switch sides and 
survive for years without being caught and killed by the incumbent, the fact that their relatives 
would certainly be targeted by the authorities was a decisive factor in deterring recidivism among 
defectors.   
The Chechen case is rather case-specific. This is conditioned by the semi-archaic 
organization of Chechen society (clans and extended families) and the prevalence of the principle of 
collective responsibility, enshrined in the local tradition, that implies that one’s family and clan are 
to be held accountable for the misdeeds of their individual members (retaliation and blood revenge). 
In other cases void of these properties, retributive violence against the kin of prospective double-
defectors may not be deployed. Instead, depending on various contextual circumstances, other 
mechanisms are likely to be deployed to deter defection and double-defection. On the other hand, as 
available sources indicate, executions of defectors or double-defectors appear to be standard 
practice to deter side-switching.  
Two major and intertwined factors contributed to the overall effectiveness of the discussed 
counter-defection mechanisms in Chechnya: community structure and the relative strength of 
counterinsurgents. The emergence of kadyrovtsy and their attacks on insurgents and their relatives 
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created a civil war-like situation in Chechnya that led to the polarization of the local clan-based 
society. Against the backdrop of prospective retaliation at the hands of the insurgents and their 
relatives, kadyrovtsy’s families started providing support to their kin in the ranks of pro-Moscow 
paramilitaries. In an attempt to avoid severe reprisals at the hand of Russian military-backed 
kadyrovtsy, many locals chose to refrain from aiding insurgents. To use Berman’s concept, the 
payoff of a prospective double-defection would be highly questionable due to the absent or minimal 
popular support and the relative weakness of insurgent groups. In other words, a would-be double-
defector would have nowhere to hide and no networks to use for him and his relatives to avoid 
punishment. Under these circumstances, the defection constraint was extremely high.  
 While this empirical case study does not lay explicit claim to generalizability, it does have 
implications for future research. Firstly, albeit first-hand data is in short supply on double-defection 
and double-defectors, this article suggests that counterinsurgents seriously consider the problem of 
double-defections and deliberately implement mechanisms to prevent recidivism among defected 
ex-insurgents.  Secondly and relatedly, this study challenges the notion of defectors as a perfectly 
loyal force. While some side-switch out of conviction or to settle scores with former fellow 
insurgents, there appears to be a segment of insurgents that defect under coercion. Some of the latter 
category of defectors may actually consider repeated side-switching. This explains the draconian 
counter-defection mechanisms put in place by the incumbent in Chechnya. Thirdly, understanding 
these counter-defection mechanisms enables researchers to address the issue of civilian 
victimization from a novel and under-researched perspective. As we demonstrated in this article, 
some civilians become entangled in score-settling with defectors as they are held captive for the 
prospective betrayal of their relatives. In addition, in spite of the scarcity of data on double-
defection, we point to the need to carry out further research on this important phenomenon. For 
example, in conflicts involving numerous rebel groups – such as the Syrian civil war - the issue of 
double-defections is equally important for both the insurgents and the incumbent. In multi-actor 
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conflicts, all sides are likely to face the challenge of repeated side-switching.  Further empirical 
research is needed to allow for theorization on the patterns of double-defection and the effectivity of 
various counter-defection mechanisms aimed against prospective side-switchers in the ranks of 
those who defected once.  
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